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Actions Speak Louder Than Words:
Hanham v. Access Management
Group L.P. Reestablishes Validity
for Course of Conduct Parol
Contracts in Georgia*
by Elizabeth C. Selph
I. INTRODUCTION
Many laypeople recognize and revere the value of a written contract
as an instrument legally binding, but they also believe such work to be
solidified in its construction, unamendable without a rewriting of the
agreement. Georgia courts, however, for over a century have allowed for
contracts not governed by the statute of frauds1 to be amended through
oral agreements or course of conduct.2 This principle was reaffirmed in
Hanham v. Access Management Group L.P.,3 a 2019 Georgia Supreme
Court case where the court recognized that written contracts can be
amended by course of conduct in the state of Georgia. 4 Prior to 2019,
several Georgia Court of Appeals cases, using a slightly altered
definition for a breach of contract from a 2013 Georgia Court of Appeals

* Thank you to Jacob Selph, Tammy Brack, and Jackson Brack, whose unconditional
love, support, and understanding allowed the completion of this project and any
professional achievement I may accomplish. My thanks to Professor Michael Sabbath and
the editors of the Mercer Law Review, whose advice, diligence, and insight provided
immeasurable guidance. Thank you to the Selph, Brost, and Swanson family for
continued love, kindness, and encouragement. Thank you as well to friends and other
family for your love and support.
1. O.C.G.A. § 13-5-30 (2018).
2. See Eaves & Collins v. Cherokee Iron Co., 73 Ga. 459 (1884); Rogers v. Atkinson,
1 Ga. 12 (1846).
3. Hanham v. Access Mgmt. Group L.P., 305 Ga. 414, 825 S.E.2d 217 (2019).
4. Id. at 417, 825 S.E. 2d at 220.
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case,5 excluded all evidence that attempted to show any agreement
which modified or amended any text in the written contract. 6 The only
action considered by the courts under this new definition for a breach of
contract claim were actions that were "specified in the contract." 7
Although this revised definition used for a breach of contract was
only slightly altered from the original definition used previously in
Georgia courts8 and was seemingly only a simple and innocent
rewording, the definition had profound effects on contract law in
Georgia. The new definition quickly became established precedent in
several Georgia cases, and courts in Georgia refuted or did not consider
arguments in cases where parties attempted to argue for behavior or
interactions forming a new agreement. The courts stated that any basis
of action had to accrue from matters "as specified in the contract." 9 In
2018, the Georgia Court of Appeals used the revised definition for a
breach of contract to hold that an contract could not be amended in the
absence of a written modification, 10 ignoring the rulings of Georgia
courts since 1884.11
Hanham v. Access Management Group L.P. showed how a simple and
innocent rewording of a rule had a profound effect on contract law
despite established and well-recorded precedent.12 The cases preceding
Hanham v. Access Management Group L.P. also highlight how quickly
an incorrect rule can be repeated by courts and harm people's rights in

5. See UWork.com, Inc. v. Paragon Techs., Inc., 321 Ga. App. 584, 590, 740 S.E.2d
887, 893 (2013).
6. See Access Mgmt. Group, L.P. v. Hanham, 345 Ga. App. 130, 132, 812 S.E.2d 509,
512 (2018); Miller v. Tate, 346 Ga. App. 315, 317, 814 S.E.2d 430, 432 (2018); Walker v.
Oglethorpe Power Corp., 341 Ga. App. 647, 670, 802 S.E.2d 643, 665 (2017); Shiho Seki v.
Groupon, Inc., 333 Ga. App. 319, 322, 775 S.E.2d 776, 779 (2015); Cordell & Cordell, P.C.
v. Gao, 331 Ga. App. 522, 526, 771 S.E.2d 196, 200 (2015); Inland Atl. Old Nat. Phase I,
LLC v. 6425 Old Nat., LLC, 329 Ga. App. 671, 677, 766 S.E.2d 86, 92 (2014).
7. See Access Mgmt. Group, L.P., 345 Ga. App. at 132, 812 S.E.2d at 512; Miller, 346
Ga. App. at 317, 814 S.E.2d at 432; Walker, 341 Ga. App. at 670, 802 S.E.2d at 665; Shiho
Seki, 333 Ga. App. at 322, 775 S.E.2d at 779; Cordell & Cordell, P.C., 331 Ga. App. at 526,
771 S.E.2d at 200; Inland Atl. Old Nat. Phase I, LLC, 329 Ga. App. at 677, 766 S.E.2d at
92; UWork.com, Inc., 321 Ga. App. at 590, 740 S.E.2d at 893.
8. Cooley v. Moss, 123 Ga. 707, 708, 51 S.E. 625, 625 (1905).
9. See Access Mgmt. Group, L.P., 345 Ga. App. at 132, 812 S.E.2d at 512; Miller, 346
Ga. App. at 317, 814 S.E.2d at 432; Walker, 341 Ga. App. at 670, 802 S.E.2d at 665; Shiho
Seki, 333 Ga. App. at 322, 775 S.E.2d at 779; Cordell & Cordell, P.C., 331 Ga. App. at 526,
771 S.E.2d at 200; Inland Atl. Old Nat. Phase I, LLC, 329 Ga. App. at 677, 766 S.E.2d 86,
92; UWork.com, Inc., 321 Ga. App. at 590, 740 S.E.2d at 893.
10. Access Mgmt. Group, L.P., 345 Ga. App. at 132, 812 S.E.2d at 512.
11. Eaves & Collins, 73 Ga. at 470.
12. Hanham, 305 Ga. at 417–18, 825 S.E.2d at 220–21.
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a common law system.13 With this 2019 decision, the Georgia Supreme
Court discarded the 2013 definition of a breach of contract and once
again allowed courts to consider and question the validity of a contract
based on interactions which take place outside of the written
agreement.14
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Under its Declaration of Covenants, the St. Marlo Homeowner's
Association delegated the management of the St. Marlo neighborhood to
Access Management, a third party.15 Access Management, as part of the
agreement, was to "[o]perate and maintain the Development according
to the highest standards achievable consistent with the overall plan"
but could only work within the neighborhood's common areas. 16 Over
time, Access Management, without the consent of the St. Marlo
Homeowner's Association, expanded their purview to "managing the
homeowner application process for landscaping modifications," which
included the residence of Marie Berthe-Narchet.17
Berthe-Narchet presented to Access Management an application to
modify her backyard.18 Despite the application's lack of compliance with
the architectural standards manual of the St. Marlo Homeowner's
Association, Access Management approved the modification, and
Berthe-Narchet hired a landscaper to complete the project.19 Once the
project was underway, as a result of the lack of compliance, the
alterations caused the property of Mary and James Hanham, neighbors
of Berthe-Narchet, to be flooded.20
Mary and James Hanham brought, among several claims, a claim of
breach of contract against Access Management for alleged "breach of its
contractual duties under the management agreement." 21 The Forsyth
County Superior Court found for the Hanhams on the breach of contract
claim, denying Access Management's motion for directed verdict, under
13. See Access Mgmt. Group, L.P., 345 Ga. App. at 132, 812 S.E.2d at 512; Miller, 346
Ga. App. at 317, 814 S.E.2d at 432; Walker, 341 Ga. App. at 670, 802 S.E.2d at 665; Shiho
Seki, 333 Ga. App. at 322, 775 S.E.2d at 779; Cordell & Cordell, P.C., 331 Ga. App. at 526,
771 S.E.2d at 200; Inland Atl. Old Nat. Phase I, LLC, 329 Ga. App. at 677, 766 S.E.2d at
92.
14. Hanham, 305 Ga. at 417–18, 825 S.E.2d at 220.
15. Id. at 415, 825 S.E.2d at 219.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 414–15, 825 S.E.2d at 218–19.
20. Id. at 414, 825 S.E.2d at 218.
21. Id. at 415, 825 S.E.2d at 219.
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the argument that Mary and James Hanham were third-party
beneficiaries of the contract between the St. Marlo Homeowner's
Association and Access Management.22
At the Georgia Court of Appeals, Access Management stated that the
superior court mistakenly denied Access Management's motion for
directed verdict on the breach of contract claim, and the court agreed,
reversing.23 The Georgia Court of Appeals held that the Hanhams did
not present the requisite evidence to demonstrate that Access
Management breached its agreement with St. Marlo Homeowner's
Association, stating that "[no] breach of contract claim can be founded
upon responsibilities not specified in the contract," 24 relying upon five
other Georgia Court of Appeals' cases. 25 The Georgia Supreme Court
ultimately reversed the Georgia Court of Appeals' rulings, holding that
a contract, at least between private parties,26 can be altered or modified
by later course of conduct.27
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Adoption of Parol Agreements and Course of Conduct Modifications
for Written Contracts in Georgia
Cooley v. Moss,28 a 1905 Georgia Supreme Court case, was the first
Georgia court case to outline the elements for a breach of contract in a
similar manner as is written today. 29 Previous court cases dealt with
breaches of contracts, such as Smith v. Georgia Loan, Savings &
Banking Co.30 in 1901, but courts discussed the breach only as it related
to the fact pattern of the case. 31 In Cooley, the court's definition of
breach of contract bodes strong similarities to the Georgia courts of
today's definition; Cooley set the foundation for future breach of
contract claims in Georgia.32
22. Id. at 416, 825 S.E.2d at 219.
23. Access Mgmt. Group L.P., 345 Ga. App. at 132, 812 S.E.2d at 512.
24. Id.
25. Hanham, 305 Ga. at 418, 825 S.E.2d at 221.
26. Only the written contract is enforceable in a dispute involving a state actor. Any
non-written modifications are not allowed in a dispute with the state because only a
written contract can waive the state's sovereign immunity to allow suit. Georgia Dep't of
Labor v. RTT Assocs., Inc., 299 Ga. 78, 82, 786 S.E.2d 840, 843 (2016).
27. Hanham, 305 Ga. at 418–19, 825 S.E.2d at 221.
28. 123 Ga. at 707, 51 S.E. at 625.
29. Id. at 708, 51 S.E. at 625.
30. Smith v. Georgia Loan, Sav. & Banking Co., 113 Ga. 975, 39 S.E. 410 (1901).
31. Id. at 976–77, 39 S.E. at 410–11.
32. Cooley, 123 Ga. at 708, 51 S.E. at 625.
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One of the earliest cases in Georgia ruling that a written contract can
be modified by subsequent agreements was Rogers v. Atkinson,33 an
1846 Georgia Supreme Court case. The court in Rogers stated that the
court may admit "evidence of conversations [and circumstances]
subsequent to the time of making the agreement . . . to show that the
parties agreed afterwards to vary the contract." 34 While the Rogers
decision did not state a source in its reasoning (perhaps English law),
Georgia courts have since adopted the same rationale of Rogers, and the
same rationale has been used in almost every breach of contract dispute
involving a subsequent agreement in Georgia since.
Subsequent oral modifications to written contracts has been codified
in Georgia since The Code of the State of Georgia,35 the first legislative
code for the state, which was published in 1861. 36 Such a revision is
called a parol agreement or a parol contract, which is defined in Black's
Law Dictionary as "a contract or modification of a contract that is not in
writing."37 In The Code of the State of Georgia, parol evidence is allowed
"to prove a new and distinct subsequent agreement." 38
Since Eaves & Collins v. Cherokee Iron Co.39 in 1884, parties have
been able to modify a written contract through subsequent course of
conduct.40 In this decision, the Georgia Supreme Court ruled that,
When a contract is in writing, each party has a right to expect the
other to do precisely what he promises; but if, in the course of the
execution of its terms—the carrying them into practical execution in
a continuous business—some of those terms are departed from and

33. Rogers v. Atkinson, 1 Ga. at 12.
34. Id. at 22, 23.
35. Cobb's Digest § 10-2-3729 (1861).
36. Contracts, however, cannot be modified without a written amendment when the
contract, as modified, is subject to the statute of frauds. O.C.G.A. § 13-5-30. Under
Georgia law, the statute of frauds mandates that a contract and its amendment must be
in writing and signed by the party to be responsible if the amended contract is a promise
by an executor or administrator to answer for damages out of his own estate, a promise to
answer for the debt of another, any marriage agreement, any contract for the sale of lands
or concerning lands, any agreement that cannot be performed within one year of the
contract's creation, any promise to revive a debt barred by the statute of limitations, and
any commitment to lend money. Id. The statute of frauds has been in Georgia law since
The Code of the State of Georgia for 1861. Cobb's Digest § 3-2-1952 (1861). The term
"statute of frauds," however, was not codified in The Code of the State of Georgia until
1895. Ga. Code of 1895, § 8-1-3642.
37. CONTRACT, Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019).
38. Cobb's Digest § 10-2-3729.
39. 73 Ga. 459 (1884).
40. Id. at 470.
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money is paid and received on that departure for some time . . . the
departure is a sort of new agreement.41

This decision was later codified in the 1895 The Code of the State of
Georgia.42
B. Allowance of Parol Agreements and Course of Conduct Modifications
Prior To Hanham v. Access Management Group L.P.
Parol agreements and course of conduct modifications have a long
history in Georgia case law prior to 2019. Since 1846 with Rogers v.
Atkinson,43 courts have repeatedly allowed parol agreements in a
myriad of cases. The same can be stated with Eaves & Collins v.
Cherokee Iron Co., which in 1884 established the existence of course of
conduct modifications into case law. 44 Except when a written contract
disallows any course of conduct modifications, 45 parties are usually
bound by their proven conduct as well as a written contract.
Parker v. Brown House Co.46 is a 1903 Georgia Supreme Court case
that considered both parol agreements and course of conduct
modifications to a written contract.47 In Parker, both parties agreed in a
leasing contract that any desired repairs to be made to the leased
building had to be submitted as a notice detailing the type of repair
desired and an estimate of the cost of repair. This notice then had to be
approved by both parties before repairs could begin. The parties would
also pay equally for any costs of repair.48
The defendant began to ask the plaintiff to repair the leased building
but did not require the plaintiff to submit a notice and never approved
the repairs in writing. The plaintiff continued to do repairs at the
request of the defendant, but never received the requisite notice or
approval. Near the end of the lease after all the repairs were finished,
the plaintiff submitted to the defendant the cost of the repairs so the
defendant could pay half the cost; the defendant refused to pay because
he had not received the requisite notice and approval as stipulated in
the contract.49
41. Id.
42. Ga. Code of 1895, § 8-1-3642.
43. 1 Ga. at 22, 23.
44. Eaves & Collins, 73 Ga. at 470.
45. Caribbean Lumber Co. v. Anderson, 205 Ga. App. 415, 417–18, 422 S.E.2d 267,
269 (1992).
46. 117 Ga. 1013, 44 S.E. 807 (1903).
47. Parker, 117 Ga. at 1014, 44 S.E. at 808.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 1014–15, 44 S.E. at 808.
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The Georgia Supreme Court stated that "no law of this [s]tate
require[d] such a stipulation to be in writing," and parties have the
ability to waive certain limitations in a contract and modify an
agreement by course of conduct.50 The court found that while there was
no express agreement in favor of the plaintiff's action, the defendant
had, by his activity, waived the obligation for the plaintiff to submit a
notice and obtain approval in order to be compensated for repairs. 51 The
court found that since the defendant "request[ed] the repairs to be
made, [stood] by without objection while they were being made, and
accept[ed] and enjoy[ed] the benefit of them after they were made," he
could not argue that the plaintiff failed to comply as specified in the
contract.52 Courts in Georgia have continually allowed such parol
agreements and course of conduct modifications in a similar manner
until a few years ago.
C. The Legal Shift to Disallowing Parol Agreements in Georgia
In Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia v. Doe,53 a
dispute arose between a university professor and the then-President
and then-Provost of the Georgia Institute of Technology over an accused
breach of an employment contract.54 In the 2006 decision, the Georgia
Court of Appeals quoted the factors of a breach of contract originally
outlined in Georgia case law by the Georgia Supreme Court in Cooley v.
Moss in 1905:55 "A breach of contract may arise in any one of three
ways, namely: by renunciation of liability under the contract; by failure
to perform the engagement; or by doing something which renders
performance impossible."56
In UWork.com, Inc. v. Paragon Techs., Inc.,57 a 2013 Georgia Court of
Appeals case involving breach of contract disputes between a contractor
and subcontractor, the court cited to Board of Regents of the University
System of Georgia when explaining the qualifications of a breach of
contract claim.58 The court in UWork.com, Inc. seemingly wanted to
slightly rephrase the court's wording in Board of Regents of the
University System of Georgia by writing the following in its definition
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Id. at 1015, 44 S.E. at 808.
Id. at 1016, 44 S.E. at 809.
Id.
278 Ga. App. 878, 630 S.E.2d 85 (2006).
Id. at 879–80, 630 S.E.2d at 87–88.
123 Ga. at 707, 51 S.E. at 625.
Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Georgia, 278 Ga. App at 887, 630 S.E.2d at 93.
321 Ga. App. 584, 740 S.E.2d 887 (2013).
Id. at 590, 740 S.E.2d at 893.

[5] SELPH CP (DO NOT DELETE)

1284

5/25/2020 9:40 PM

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71

for a breach of contract: "A breach occurs if a contracting party
repudiates or renounces liability under the contract; fails to perform the
engagement as specified in the contract; or does some act that renders
performance impossible."59
Altering "by failure to perform the engagement" 60 to "fails to perform
the engagement as specified in the contract" 61 appears to be an
innocuous change in wording. The court in UWork.com, Inc. did not
alter the phrasing of the Board of Regents of the University System of
Georgia to aid in its argument for the ruling, and the rewording was
seemingly not done to limit or narrow the ruling of Board of Regents of
the University System of Georgia. All of the requirements for a breach of
contract were reworded by UWork.com, Inc. and not that requirement
alone.62
Hanham v. Access Management L.P. mentioned the possibility that
UWork.com added the "as specified in the contract" phrase because the
case from which UWork.com pulled the rule, Board of Regents of the
University System of Georgia, focused its analysis on a written contract
created by a state actor. 63 In Board of Regents of the University System
of Georgia, a party was suing a representative of the State for a breach
of contract,64 and waiver of sovereign immunity can only occur via a
written contract.65 While UWork.com may have added the phrase "as
specified in the contract" because the issue in Board of Regents of the
University System of Georgia was whether the contract would be waived
by sovereign immunity,66 the court in Board of Regents of the University
System of Georgia explicitly stated that a state's sovereign immunity is
based upon written contracts, so its focus on written contracts is given
context.67 The court in Board of Regents of the University System of
Georgia never ruled that only the written contract could be considered,
nor did it suggest the exclusion of any parol evidence; rather, the court
only framed its discussion of reading a written contract to sovereign
immunity.68 The court in Board of Regents of the University of Georgia
59. Id.
60. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Georgia, 278 Ga. App. at 887, 630 S.E.2d at 93.
61. UWork.com, Inc., 321 Ga. App. at 590, 740 S.E.2d at 893.
62. Id.
63. Hanham, 305 Ga. at 418 n. 3, 825 S.E.2d at 221 n. 3; UWork.com, Inc., 321 Ga.
App. at 590, 740 S.E.2d at 893; Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Georgia, 278 Ga. App. at
880–81, 630 S.E.2d at 88.
64. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Georgia, 278 Ga. App. at 880, 630 S.E.2d at 88.
65. GA. CONST. art. I, § 2, ¶ IX(c) (2019).
66. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Georgia, 278 Ga. App. at 881, 630 S.E.2d at 88.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 880–81, 630 S.E.2d at 88–89.

[5] SELPH CP (DO NOT DELETE)

2020]

5/25/2020 9:40 PM

HANHAM V. ACCESS MANAGEMENT GROUP

1285

also held that a contract between the parties existed despite a lack of a
formalized written agreement because of a party's course of conduct
made in reliance to the agreement as well as promises made by both
parties; to apply from this case that contracts must be in writing would
be ignoring the holding of Board of the Regents of the University of
Georgia.69 For the court in UWork.com to assert, based on the analysis
of the court in Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia
took, that the court will never consider extraneous materials, ignores
the presence of a State actor, the circumstances surrounding sovereign
immunity, and what actually occurred in that case. 70 While such an
inference could have occurred by the court in UWork.com as suggested
by the court in Hanham v. Access Management Group, L.P., this seems
unlikely.71
The parties in UWork.com, Inc. also were not claiming a parol
agreement, and such an issue was never addressed by the court in
UWork.com, Inc. 72 The ultimate holding in UWork.com, Inc. that no
breach of contract had occurred73 would also seemingly have occurred
had the court in UWork.com, Inc. directly quoted from The Board of
Regents of the University System of Georgia in its definition for breach
of contract; the facts of the case in UWork.com, Inc. appear to fit a
breach of contract under both given definitions. 74 The alteration made
in the definition of breach of contract by UWork.com, Inc. appears to
have been done innocently, but allowed the establishment for a new
standard for parol agreements in written contracts. 75
While several cases did not contest whether parol agreement
evidence should be included, they legitimized the altered definition of a
breach of contract established in UWork.com, Inc. and aided to establish
the necessary precedent essential for the Access Management Group
L.P. v. Hanham76 ruling. Other cases, however, more directly laid the
groundwork for parol agreements to be disallowed in written contracts
69. Id. at 881, 630 S.E.2d at 89.
70. See id. at 880–81, 630 S.E.2d at 88–89.
71. Hanham, 305 Ga. at 418 n. 3, 825 S.E.2d at 221 n. 3; Id.
72. UWork.com, Inc., 321 Ga. App. at 589–90, 740 S.E.2d at 892–93.
73. Id. at 594, 740 S.E.2d at 895.
74. See id.; Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Georgia, 278 Ga. App. at 887, 630
S.E.2d at 93.
75. See Access Mgmt. Group, L.P., 345 Ga. App. at 132, 812 S.E.2d at 512; Miller, 346
Ga. App. at 317, 814 S.E.2d at 432; Walker, 341 Ga. App. at 670, 802 S.E.2d at 665; Shiho
Seki, 333 Ga. App. at 322, 775 S.E.2d at 779; Cordell & Cordell, P.C., 331 Ga. App. at 526,
771 S.E.2d at 200; Inland Atl. Old Nat. Phase I, LLC, 329 Ga. App. at 677, 766 S.E.2d at
92.
76. 345 Ga. App. 130, 812 S.E.2d 509.
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in Georgia though factual similarities to Access Management Group L.P.
v. Hanham. In Shiho Seki v. Groupon, Inc.,77 a 2015 Georgia Court of
Appeals case, the court directly quoted UWork.com, Inc. when
establishing the elements for a breach of contract claim. 78 The breach of
contract claim revolved around allegations of Groupon failing to pay
Seki's business for vouchers as promised via a written agreement,
despite evidence showing otherwise.79 The court held under the
UWork.com, Inc. qualifications that a breach of contract had not
occurred.80
Miller v. Tate81 also used the same language from UWork.com, Inc. in
its discussion of a breach of contract issue.82 In that case, a seller of a
home and the prospective buyer entered into a purchase and sale
agreement, but the actions of the buyer prevented the final closing from
occurring.83 The Georgia Court of Appeals in 2018 held that a breach of
contract did occur by the buyers for their delay in closing the sale as
agreed.84
In Walker v. Oglethorpe Power Corporation,85 the court quoted from
both UWork.com, Inc. and Shiho Seki when establishing the parameters
for a breach of contract claim. 86 In this 2017 Georgia Court of Appeals
case, former customers of several electric-membership corporations
(EMCs) sued their respective EMCs and the larger electric cooperatives
for breach of contract when their respective EMCs failed to distribute
patronage capital as specified in the contract. 87
The court ultimately held for the EMCs on the breach of contract
claim.88 The appellants were chastised for not introducing a "particular
provision in the EMCs bylaws [that] expressly mandates" repayment, 89
as is required by the UWork.com, Inc. and Shiho Seki reading of "fails
to perform the engagement as specified in the contract." 90 The former
customers attempted to argue that such a position was apparent
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

333 Ga. App. 319, 775 S.E.2d 776.
Id. at 322, 775 S.E.2d at 779.
Id. at 321–22, 775 S.E.2d at 779.
Shiho Seki, 333 Ga. App. at 322, 775 S.E.2d at 779.
346 Ga. App. 315, 814 S.E.2d 430.
Id. at 317, 814 S.E.2d at 432.
Id. at 318, 814 S.E.2d at 433.
Id. at 318–19, 814 S.E.2d at 433.
341 Ga. App. 647, 802 S.E.2d 643.
Id. at 670, 802 S.E.2d at 664–65.
Id. at 647, 802 S.E.2d at 648–49.
Id. at 673, 802 S.E.2d at 666–67.
Id. at 671, 802 S.E.2d at 665.
Id. at 670, 802 S.E.2d at 664–65.
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through the conduct exemplified by the EMCs' bylaws, but this
argument was rejected because no contract provision was attached to
the appellants' claim.91
Inland Atlantic Old National Phase I, LLC v. 6245 Old National,
LLC,92 a 2014 Georgia Court of Appeals case, involved two parties who
entered into an agreement to develop a shopping center. As part of the
agreement, 6525 Old National, LLC was obligated to supervise the
construction and oversee a contractor working on the shopping center
during the first phase of the project. Either party was able to rescind
the contract at any point during the first phase of the project if any
problems arose.93
Serious issues with the development of the project and the ability of
the contractor began at the outset of the project and ran throughout the
first phase. Both parties did nothing as a response throughout most of
the contract.94 Near the end of the agreement, Inland Atlantic Old
National Phase I, LLC warned 6525 Old National, LLC of its lack of
compliance, but then gave 6525 Old National, LLC final payment for
the work completed.95
Inland Atlantic Old National Phase I, LLC directly quoted the
revised definition of a breach of contract as used in UWork.com, Inc. to
determine the culpability of 6525 Old National, LLC. 96 While the court
recognized the possibility of the contract being ambiguous, it did not
discuss the use of parol evidence or a consideration that the terms of
the agreement were altered during the course of conduct. 97 The court
stated that, due to a clause in the contract where inaction of a party
cannot be construed as a waiver, no breach of contract occurred in this
case.98
A similar issue arose in Cordell & Cordell, P.C. v. Gao,99 a Georgia
Court of Appeals case decided in 2015. In Cordell & Cordell, P.C., Gao
sued a law firm when he was alerted to a possible breach of fiduciary
duty when the firm was working on his case. 100 Gao told the firm "to

91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

Id. at 671, 802 S.E.2d at 665.
329 Ga. App. 671, 766 S.E.2d 86.
Id. at 672–73, 766 S.E.2d at 89–90.
Id. at 673, 766 S.E.2d at 90.
Id. at 678, 766 S.E.2d at 93.
Id. at 677, 766 S.E.2d at 92.
Id. at 678, 766 S.E.2d at 93.
Id.
331 Ga. App. 522, 771 S.E.2d 196.
Id. at 522, 771 S.E.2d at 197.
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handle [the] matter in the most economical manner possible."101 Gao
was possibly aware of the firm not working in his best financial
interest, but he still paid the firm for its work.102
The court in that case used the elements of breach of contract from
UWork.com, Inc., this time quoting from Inland Atlantic Old National
Phase I, LLC,103 in order to reach a denial for the directed verdict of a
breach of contract claim.104 Rather than considering possible course of
conduct modifications or other information to suggest an alteration to
the contract, the court only considered information from the contract in
respect to the rule written in Inland Atlantic Old National Phase I,
LLC.105
The quickly-established precedent of a new definition for a breach of
contract came directly into focus with Access Management Group, L.P.
v. Hanham, the first case to question the new wording of the Georgia
Court of Appeals. Rather than the new rule only possibly interfering
with certain evidence being considered to impact a court's holding,
Access Management Group, L.P. v. Hanham became the first case to
directly challenge the rule established in UWork.com, Inc. for the
admittance of parol agreements.106
A 2018 Georgia Court of Appeals case, Access Management Group,
L.P. v. Hanham, stated that Access Management and St. Marlo
Homeowner's Association agreed by course of conduct to modify the
responsibilities outlined in the management agreement. 107 The case
quoted from Cordell & Cordell, P.C. a rule established in many previous
cases that "a breach of contract, however, only occurs where 'a
contracting party. . .fails to perform the engagement as specified in the
contract.'"108 The court then used this logic to refute any considerations
that are not written in the contract, thus ruling against the claims of
the Hanhams.109 "Neither this, nor any, breach of contract claim can be
founded upon responsibilities not specified in the contract." 110

101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

Id. at 522, 771 S.E.2d at 198.
Id. at 522, 771 S.E.2d at 198.
Id. at 526, 771 S.E.2d at 200.
Id. at 522, 771 S.E.2d at 197.
Id. at 526, 771 S.E.2d at 200.
Access Mgmt. Group, L.P., 345 Ga. App. at 132, 812 S.E.2d at 512.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

[5] SELPH CP (DO NOT DELETE)

2020]

5/25/2020 9:40 PM

HANHAM V. ACCESS MANAGEMENT GROUP

1289

IV. COURT'S RATIONALE
In Hanham v. Access Management Group L.P., the primary issue was
whether a breach of contract had occurred when parties to a contract by
subsequent course of conduct agreed to a term not written in the
contract.111 Justice Harold D. Melton wrote for the Georgia Supreme
Court that a contract may be modified through an agreement
subsequent to the contract's formation, and the parties' course of
conduct, not just written or oral modifications, can modify the
contract.112 This holding disapproved the ruling of other cases for the
Georgia Court of Appeals, where terms and conditions not expressly
outlined in the contract were held never to be a part of the agreement
between the parties.113
The Georgia Supreme Court stated in Hanham v. Access
Management Group L.P. that a written contract can be modified by
later course of conduct, as long as the parties have sufficient
consideration, all the parties assent to the modification, and the
modification is not disallowed by contract laws concerning the statute of
frauds, contract laws about state actors, any other laws, or a provision
within the original contract forbidding a modification to the contract.114
The court declared that since both Access Management and St. Marlo
agreed by course of conduct to widen the scope of the responsibilities of
Access Management in a manner that was not illegal, they modified the
terms of the management agreement and can be held liable for breach
of contract.115
As the basis in its holding, the Georgia Supreme Court relied upon
its previous decision in American Century Mortgage Investors v.
Bankamerica Realty Investors116 and Vasche v. Habersham Marina,117 a
Georgia Court of Appeals decision.118 In those cases, breach of parol
agreements were the central issue of the plaintiffs' claims, and the
courts ruled that agreements made subsequent to a written contract

111. Hanham, 305 Ga. at 416–17, 825 S.E.2d at 220.
112. Id. at 417, 825 S.E.2d at 220.
113. See Access Mgmt. Group, L.P., 345 Ga. App. at 132, 812 S.E.2d at 512; Miller, 346
Ga. App. at 317, 814 S.E.2d at 432; Walker, 341 Ga. App. at 670, 802 S.E.2d at 665; Shiho
Seki, 333 Ga. App. at 322, 775 S.E.2d at 779; Cordell & Cordell, P.C., 331 Ga. App. at 526,
771 S.E.2d at 200; Inland Atl. Old Nat. Phase I, LLC, 329 Ga. App. at 677, 766 S.E.2d at
92; UWork.com, Inc., 321 Ga. App. at 590, 740 S.E.2d at 893.
114. Hanham, 305 Ga. at 417, 825 S.E.2d at 220. See generally O.C.G.A. § 13-5-30.
115. Hanham, 305 Ga. at 418, 825 S.E.2d at 221.
116. 246 Ga. 39, 268 S.E.2d 609 (1980).
117. 209 Ga. App. 263, 433 S.E.2d 671 (1993).
118. Hanham, 305 Ga. at 417, 825 S.E.2d at 220.
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can modify the contract.119 The court in Hanham v. Access Management
Group L.P. also referenced Albany Federal Savings & Loan Association
v. Henderson,120 a 1945 Georgia Supreme Court decision, as the basis
for its ruling that modifications to a contract can occur via the parties'
mutual course of conduct.121
The Georgia Supreme Court criticized the approach applied by the
Georgia Court of Appeals to reach its conclusion. 122 Instead of applying
its recognition "that Access Management and St. Marlo 'mutually
agreed by course of conduct' to modify" the contract,123 the Georgia
Court of Appeals utilized the rule established in UWork.com, Inc. to
hold that a course of conduct parol agreement did not meet the
parameters to qualify for a breach of contract. 124 The Georgia Supreme
Court criticized the Georgia Court of Appeals for relying in error upon
other decisions made by the Court of Appeals rather than holdings by
the Georgia Supreme Court.125
The court also mentioned Cordell & Cordell, P.C. and Inland Atlantic
Old National Phase I, LLC to note how courts incorrectly could ignore
course of conduct modifications simply because the information was not
in a written contract.126 The Georgia Supreme Court finally highlighted
the first case in which breach of contract was established in the State of
Georgia, Cooley v. Moss.127
As a side note focusing not on the error of the rule but rather its
adaptation by the Georgia Court of Appeals, the court in Access
Management Group, L.P. v. Hanham claimed that a breach of contract
"only occurs" in the three scenarios outlined in the remainder of the
rule.128 The "only occurs" language present within the case seems to be
an inclusion by the court and is found nowhere else in the provided case
law.129 Such language is not present within Cordell & Cordell, P.C.,130

119. Am. Century Mortg. Inv., 246 Ga. at 40, 268 S.E.2d at 611; Vasche, 209 Ga. App.
at 265, 433 S.E.2d at 673–74.
120. 200 Ga. 79, 36 S.E.2d 330 (1945).
121. Hanham, 305 Ga. at 417, 825 S.E.2d at 220.
122. Id. at 417–18, 825 S.E.2d at 220–21.
123. Id. at 417, 825 S.E.2d at 220 (quoting Access Mgmt. Group, L.P., 345 Ga. App. at
132, 812 S.E.2d at 512 (2018)).
124. Id. at 417–18, 825 S.E.2d at 220.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 418, 825 S.E.2d at 221.
128. Access Mgmt. Group, L.P., 345 Ga. App. at 132, 812 S.E.2d at 512.
129. See Cooley, 123 Ga. at 708, 51 S.E. at 625; Miller, 346 Ga. App. at 317, 814 S.E.2d
at 432; Walker, 341 Ga. App. at 670, 802 S.E.2d at 665; Shiho Seki, 333 Ga. App. at 322,
775 S.E.2d at 779; Cordell & Cordell, P.C., 331 Ga. App. at 526, 771 S.E.2d at 200; Inland
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the case from which Access Management Group, L.P. v. Hanham pulled
the quote, nor UWork.com, Inc.,131 where the quote originated, or any
other breach of contract claim case using the elements provided by
UWork.com, Inc. .132 The Georgia Court of Appeals' arbitrary inclusion
of "only occurs"133 provided another example of how a simple rewording
by the court, perhaps to increase dramatic flair or to attract the
attention of the reader, could lead to adverse results by accidental
limitation of a breach of contract claim.134
V. IMPLICATIONS
The strongest benefit visible by the decision in Hanham v. Access
Management Group is the reestablishment and solidification of parol
agreements and course of conduct modifications in the state of Georgia.
Through this decision, parties are no longer confined to the words of a
document that may not have had exact replication to the nature of the
Atl. Old Nat. Phase I, LLC, 329 Ga. App. at 677, 766 S.E.2d at 92 (2014); UWork.com,
Inc., 321 Ga. App. at 590, 740 S.E.2d at 893.
130. Cordell & Cordell, P.C., 331 Ga. App. at 526, 771 S.E.2d at 200.
131. UWork.com, Inc., 321 Ga. App. at 590, 740 S.E.2d at 893.
132. See Cooley, 123 Ga. at 708, 51 S.E. at 625; Miller, 346 Ga. App. at 317, 814 S.E.2d
at 432; Walker, 341 Ga. App. at 670, 802 S.E.2d at 665; Shiho Seki, 333 Ga. App. at 322,
775 S.E.2d at 779; Inland Atl. Old Nat. Phase I, LLC, 329 Ga. App. at 677, 766 S.E.2d at
92.
133. Access Mgmt. Group, L.P., 345 Ga. App. at 132, 812 S.E.2d at 512.
134. Hanham v. Access Management Group, L.P. is not the first time in recent Georgia
history that the Georgia Court of Appeals has neglected long-established Georgia
Supreme Court precedent and accidentally created an altered rule that was quickly
promulgated through many Georgia Court of Appeals cases. In State v. Harper, 303 Ga.
144, 810 S.E.2d 484 (2018), the Georgia Supreme Court noticed that an incorrect standard
for trespass had been used by the Georgia Court of Appeals. Id. at 144–46, 810 S.E.2d at
485–86. Rather than continue the long-established standard by the Georgia Supreme
Court that only explicit notice to alert forbidden entry as necessary to constitute a
trespass, See Murphey v. State, 115 Ga. 201, 202, 41 S.E. 685, 686 (1902), the Georgia
Court of Appeals in 1997 altered the rule and stated that express notice, rather than
explicit notice, was required, Wood v. State, 227 Ga. App. 677, 678, 490 S.E.2d 179, 180–
81 (1997), based on the wording of a 1973 Georgia Court of Appeals case that mentioned
the defendant's express notice. Scott v. State, 130 Ga. App. 75, 78, 202 S.E.2d 201, 204
(1973). Many Georgia Court of Appeals cases began to then promulgate this express
notice standard established in 1997 when a 2008 Georgia Court of Appeals case adopted
an express notice standard in its case on trespass. Osborne v. State, 290 Ga. App. 188,
189 (2008). See Harper v. State, 338 Ga. App. 535, 538 (2016); Sheehan v. State, 314 Ga.
App. 325, 326 (2012). While the Georgia Supreme Court readopted the explicit notice
standard in 2018, State v. Harper evidences along with Hanham v. Access Management,
L.P. a possible history of the Georgia Court of Appeals neglecting or incorrectly applying
standards of the Georgia Supreme Court despite clear precedent. State v. Harper, 303 Ga.
at 144–46, 810 S.E.2d at 485–86.
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parties' interactions and can seek justice for violations of an
arrangement that originated outside of an established written
agreement. Evidence of behavior and actions by the parties can be used
to show the possibility of a new contract's formation, to the benefit of
the party who relied upon the conduct exhibited by the other party. 135
Hanham v. Access Management Group L.P. is also a cautious
reminder to writers about the law and interpreters of the law alike how
instrumental precise wording is to the correct functioning of
government. While the rewording seemingly meant only to reintroduce
the elements of a breach of contract in a new manner and not to limit or
alter the definition, such an alteration affected several Georgia Court of
Appeals cases and possibly interfered and denied parties from rights
which they deserved. By either not considering or directly denying
parties the possibility of an outside agreement beyond the written
contract, the court hindered themselves from working in the best
interest of the parties for the pursuit of fairness and equality.
The chain of events which led to the decision of Access Management
Group L.P. v. Hanham is interesting not only to analyze the necessity of
precise wording, but also as a commentary upon the common law
system. The history leading to Access Management Group L.P. v.
Hanham shows how quickly the erroneous rewording of established
rules can promulgate and become precedent in courtrooms throughout
the state.136 Without an examination by courts of the origins of certain
rules quoted or cited in previous decisions, courts introduce the
possibility of reaffirming an incorrect rule that either denies rights to a
current party or will harm a party in future cases. Without another
mechanism in place that could stem these types of results, litigants who
get their cases resolved in the Georgia Court of Appeals and are not
able to appeal to the Georgia Supreme Court seem to risk being subject
to departures in precedent by the Georgia Court of Appeals. 137 While
UWork.com filed a motion for reconsideration that was denied, Walker,
Shiho Seki, and Cordell & Cordell, P.C. never filed an appeal to the

135. Hanham, 305 Ga. at 417, 825 S.E.2d at 220.
136. See Cooley, 123 Ga. at 708, 51 S.E. at 625; Miller, 346 Ga. App. at 317, 814 S.E.2d
at 432; Walker, 341 Ga. App. at 670, 802 S.E.2d at 665; Shiho Seki, 333 Ga. App. at 322,
775 S.E.2d at 779; Cordell & Cordell, P.C., 331 Ga. App. at 526, 771 S.E.2d at 200; Inland
Atl. Old Nat. Phase I, LLC, 329 Ga. App. at 677, 766 S.E.2d at 92; UWork.com, Inc., 321
Ga. App. at 590, 740 S.E.2d at 893.
137. For reasons that a litigant might be unable to appeal a ruling, see Donna Bader,
10
Good
Reasons
Not
To
Appeal,
PLAINTIFF
MAGAZINE,
https://www.plaintiffmagazine.com/recent-issues/item/10-good-reasons-not-to-appeal (last
visited Oct. 4, 2019).
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Georgia Supreme Court.138 By reiterating an error of previous courts on
a rule of law as good law without ensuring its accuracy, future cases
risk the possibility of adopting incorrect law for years and harming
many people until someone has the insight to catch the error. Hanham
v. Access Management Group L.P. serves as a reminder to those who
use case law to argue for their clients or for those who apply case law in
binding decisions that they must ensure the accuracy of the information
presented in previous courts rather than unwavering acceptance of that
information, in order to best serve the client's interest or in the best
interest of correctly preserving the law.

138. Walker, 341 Ga. App. 647, 802 S.E.2d 643; Shiho Seki, 333 Ga. App. 319, 775
S.E.2d 776; Cordell & Cordell, P.C., 331 Ga. App. 522, 771 S.E.2d 196; UWork.com, Inc.,
321 Ga. App. 584, 740 S.E.2d 887.

[5] SELPH CP (DO NOT DELETE)

1294

5/25/2020 9:40 PM

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71

